Abstract-Dynamic spectrum access (DSA) can effectively improve the spectrum efficiency and alleviate the spectrum scarcity, by allowing unlicensed secondary users (SUs) to access the licensed spectrum of primary users (PUs) opportunistically. Cooperative spectrum sharing is a new promising paradigm to provide necessary incentives for both PUs and SUs in dynamic spectrum access. The key idea is that SUs relay the traffic of PUs in exchange for the access time on the PUs' licensed spectrum. In this paper, we formulate the cooperative spectrum sharing between multiple PUs and multiple SUs as a two-sided market, and study the market equilibrium under both complete and incomplete information. First, we characterize the sufficient and necessary conditions for the market equilibrium. We analytically show that there may exist multiple market equilibria, among which there is always a unique Paretooptimal equilibrium for PUs (called PU-Optimal-EQ), in which every PU achieves a utility no worse than in any other equilibrium. Then, we show that under complete information, the unique Pareto-optimal equilibrium PU-Optimal-EQ can always be achieved despite the competition among PUs; whereas, under incomplete information, the PU-Optimal-EQ may not be achieved due to the mis-representations of SUs (in reporting their private information). Regarding this, we further study the worse-case equilibrium for PUs, and characterize a Robust equilibrium for PUs (called PU-Robust-EQ), which provides every PU a guaranteed utility under all possible mis-representation behaviors of SUs. Numerical results show that in a typical network where the number of PUs and SUs are different, the performance gap between PU-Optimal-EQ and PU-Robust-EQ is quite small (e.g., less than 10% in the simulations).
INTRODUCTION

Background and Motivation
Wireless spectrum is becoming increasingly congested and scarce with the explosive development of wireless devices and services. Dynamic spectrum access (DSA) is a promising approach to increase the spectrum efficiency and alleviate the spectrum scarcity, by allowing unlicensed secondary users (SUs) to opportunistically access to the spectrum licensed to primary users (PUs) [1] - [4] . To successfully implement DSA, it is important to offer necessary incentives for PUs to open their spectrum for SUs' utilizations, and for SUs to access the PUs' spectrum despite of the potential costs [5] - [7] .
Cooperative spectrum sharing (also called cooperative spectrum leasing [8] ) has been proposed as an effective approach to offer crucial incentives for both PUs and SUs in DSA [8] - [14] . The basic idea is that SUs relay the traffic of PUs in exchange for the opportunities to access the PUs' licensed spectrum. With the cooperative spectrum sharing, PUs can increase their transmission rates through the cooperative relay of SUs, and SUs can 
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Ph as e I P h a s e obtain transmission opportunities on the PUs' licensed spectrum. Thus, it will lead to a win-win situation for PUs and SUs. 1 Figure 1 illustrates an example of cooperative spectrum sharing between 3 PUs and 4 SUs, 2 where each SU i cooperates with PU i for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and SU 4 does not cooperate with any PU. SUs relay traffic for intended PUs according to a pre-defined cooperative protocol, such as amplified-and forward (AF) and decode-and-forward (DF). Hence, each cooperation frame is divided into 3 phases: in Phase I, each PU i's transmitter (PT i ) broadcasts its messages to its receiver (PR i ) as well as to the cooperating SU i; in Phase II, each SU i's transmitter (ST i ) forwards the received PU i's signal to the PU i's receiver PR i ; and in Phase III, each SU i transmits its own messages (from ST i to SR i ) 1 . Cooperative spectrum sharing can also be viewed as an enhanced cooperative relay scheme. From the perspective of cooperative relays (e.g., D2D relays in 5G system [28] ), it can provide the necessary incentives for SUs to relay the traffic of PUs.
2. Here each PU i is a dedicated transceiver pair {PT i , PR i }, and each SU i is also a dedicated transceiver pair {ST i , SR i }.
on the PU i's spectrum.
While there are some prior works considering the cooperative spectrum sharing problem [8] - [14] , all of these works focused on the interactions between one PU and one or multiple SUs. Our work advances the research in this area by analyzing the interaction between multiple PUs and multiple SUs as shown in Figure 1 . This more practical scenario is significantly more challenging to analyze, as not only SUs compete with each other for the PUs' licensed spectrums, but PUs also compete with each other for the SUs' collaborations. An important question arising in such a multi-PU multi-SU scenario is:
• Which PU cooperates with which SU, and what is the resource exchange (i.e., the PU's spectrum access time reward and the SU's relay effort) between them? As the traditional matching problem usually studies the binary pairing of users without considering the resource exchange details, our problem is actually an extended matching problem.
Solution and Contribution
In this work, we formulate the cooperative spectrum sharing problem between multiple PUs and multiple SUs as a two-sided matching market, with PUs as one side and SUs as the other side. A PU is matched to an SU means that the PU cooperates with the SU under certain resource exchange agreement. Accordingly, a matching between PUs and SUs defines not only their collaborative relationships, but also the resource exchange between each pair of matched PU and SU. An equilibrium is defined as a stable matching, from which neither PUs nor SUs have the incentive to deviate. For such a two-sided market, we want to answer the following questions:
• what is the market equilibrium, and which equilibrium will emerge in different information scenarios? Note that both problems are challenging due to the following reasons. First, finding the stable matching of a two-sided matching market is well-known an NP-hard problem, and thus mathematically intractable. Second, in some two-sided matching markets including the one in this paper, there may be an infinite number of market equilibria, and analytically characterizing these market equilibria is challenging. Third, different information scenarios (depending on how much information that PUs know) may lead to different market equilibria. Characterizing the equilibrium in different information scenarios is also a challenging problem.
We will study the market equilibrium in two different information scenarios systematically: complete and incomplete information. In the former case, each PU knows the whole network information, while in the latter case, each PU knows only its local network information (see Section 3.F for details). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that systematically studies cooperative spectrum sharing between multiple PUs and multiple SUs by using the matching theory. The main results and contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
• Two-sided Market Model and Solution Technique : We formulate the cooperative spectrum sharing between multiple PUs and multiple SUs as a two-sided matching market, and comprehensively study the market equilibrium (stable matching) in both complete and incomplete information scenarios.
• Equilibrium Analysis: We characterize the sufficient and necessary conditions for market equilibrium, and show that there may be an infinite number of market equilibria. We further show that these is always a unique Pareto-optimal equilibrium for PUs (PU-Optimal-EQ) , in which every PU achieves a utility no worse than that in any other equilibrium.
• Complete and Incomplete Information: We show that under complete information, the unique Paretooptimal equilibrium for PUs (PU-Optimal-EQ) can always be achieved despite of the competition among PUs. Under incomplete information, however, the PU-Optimal-EQ may not be achieved due to the mis-representations of SUs. To this end, we characterize a Robust equilibrium for PUs (PU-Robust-EQ), which provides every PU a guaranteed utility under all possible mis-representation behaviors of SUs.
• Performance Evaluation: Numerical studies show that each PU's utility increases (or decreases) with the number of SUs (or PUs) in both PU-Optimal-EQ and PU-Robust-EQ. In many practical network scenarios where the numbers of PUs and SUs are often different, the performance gap between PUOptimal-EQ and PU-Robust-EQ is quite small (e.g., less than 10% in the simulations). This implies that the equilibrium performance depends more on the market structure than on the information scenario. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the related literature. In Section 3, we present the system model. In Section 4, we provide the two-sided market formulation. In Section 5, we use a simplified example to illustrate the equilibrium. In Section 6, we study the equilibria of a general model. In Section 7, we show which equilibria will emerge in different information scenarios. We provide numerical results in Section 8, and finally conclude in Section 9.
LITERATURE REVIEW
A. Cooperative Spectrum Sharing Most prior work on cooperative spectrum sharing focused on the interactions between one PU and one or multiple SUs [8] - [14] . Some assumed that the PU has complete information of SUs (e.g., SUs' relay channel gains and sensitivities to power consumption) [8] - [11] , while others considered that the PU has limited information about SUs [12] , [13] . These works used either Stackelberg game or contract theory to model and analyze the problem. However, both approaches are difficult to be extended to the scenario of multiple PUs and multiple SUs. A closely related paper that considers the interactions between multiple PUs and multiple SUs is [14] , where authors proposed a distributed algorithm to reach a stable matching that is weak Pareto optimal. Our work generalizes the result of [14] in the following way: (i) we analytically show that there are multiple (possibly infinite) stable matchings including the Pareto optimal one studied in [14] , (ii) we characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions for all possible stable matchings, and (iii) we propose distributed algorithms converging to different stable matchings, given different information available to PUs.
B. Two-sided Matching Market
In economics, two-sided matching market is an effective framework and widely-used for studying the interactions between two disjoint player sets in a two-sided market setting. In such markets, the matching theory can systematically capture not only the cooperative interactions between users in different sides, but also the competitive interactions between users on the same side. Most early results in this area focused on the matching under complete information, without considering the incentive issues under incomplete information. The first basic two-sided market models were proposed by Gale and Shapley [15] . Shapley and Shubik [16] and Thompson [17] studied the more general models with additive and transferable utilities. Crawford and Knoer [18] , [19] studied the two-sided labor models with nontransferable utilities. Some later results [20] , [21] studied the incentive issue under incomplete information. Our work differs from the above works: we consider not only the binary matching decision, but also the detailed resource exchange between each pair of matched users.
It is notable that our analysis techniques and engineering insights are applicable to other wireless network problems that can be modeled as a two-sided market. The equilibrium obtained in this paper provides a quite general characterization of the network stable outcome in a wide range of large complicated networks.
SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a DSA network with a set M {1, ..., M } of PUs and a set N {1, ..., N } of SUs. Each PU m ∈ M (or SU n ∈ N ) is a dedicated transceiver pair {PT m , PR m } (or {ST n , SR n }) as illustrated in Figure 1 . A PU has the exclusive usage right of a licensed frequency band (with a normalized bandwidth). We assume that the frequency bands of different PUs are non-overlapping, and thus there is no interference among PUs' transmissions. As in many existing literature [8] - [14] , we further assume that there exists a common control channel for the communications and interactions between PUs and SUs.
On one hand, PUs may suffer from low transmission rates or high outage probabilities due to the poor channel conditions between their transmitters and receivers caused by, for example, the long-distance attenuation, shadowing, and fading. Thus, PUs want to employ SUs as relays to improve their transmission rates. On the other hand, SUs need spectrum resources for their own transmissions, but cannot access the PUs' licensed spectrum without PUs' permissions. Thus, we expect a win-win situation where SUs relay PUs' traffic in order to get free access time on the PUs' spectrums.
To facilitate the practical implementation, we assume that one PU can choose at most one SU to relay its traffic at a particular time (but can change the relaying SU at different time). This is motivated by existing results that choosing the most appropriate relay is usually sufficient to achieve the optimal (or close-to-optimal) performance [22] . Moreover, this can be implemented more easily in practice, as there is no need to consider the coordination among multiple relays. We further assume that each SU can serve at most one PU at a particular time (but can change the serving PU at different time). Therefore, a key question arising in such a scenario is: who will relay whose traffic, and how?
Cooperative Spectrum Sharing Protocol
We first consider the cooperative spectrum sharing protocol between a particular PU m and SU n (assuming SU n cooperates with PU m). As shown in Figure 1 , each cooperation period (frame) includes 3 phases: Phases I and II for the cooperative communication between PU m and SU n (each with a fixed period of T m /2), 3 and Phase III for SU n's own transmission (with a period of t m n ). Thus, the total length of one cooperation frame is T m + t m n . For clarity, we illustrate the structure of such a 3-phase transmission frame in Figure 2 .
Obviously, the cooperative communication protocol used in Phases I and II plays an important role in the cooperative spectrum sharing. In this paper, we adopt the widely-used Amplified-and-Forward (AF) protocol [23] in Phases I and II. 4 For the analytical convenience, we assume the AWGN channel in the physical links. Note that the channel model can be easily extended to fast fading channels (e.g., Rayleigh channel), by considering the average transmission rate or average outage probability. We further assume that each pair of transmitter and receiver know the channel gain between them through, for example, measuring the received signal strength.
For convenience, we list the key notations in Table 1 , where m is the PU index and n is the SU index. The meaning of each notation will be explained later. 3 . The total cooperative transmission period Tm is determined by the physical layer specifications. Different PUs may have different Tm.
4. Note that our analysis can be easily applied to other cooperative protocols (e.g., Decode-and-Forward and Compress-and-Forward) with minor modifications on the utility functions of PUs and SUs.
TABLE 1 Key Notations
Tm PU m's cooperative communication time (Phases I and II); Cn SU n's sensitivity of unit power consumption; Gm PU m's direct channel (PTm to PRm) gain; G n(m) SU n's direct channel (STn to SRn) gain on PU m's band; Gm,n 1st relay channel (PTm to STn) gain of PU m and SU n; Gn,m 2nd relay channel (STn to PRm) gain of PU m and SU n; p m n The relay power of SU n for PU m's traffic; t m n The dedicated access time on PU m's band for SU n; Π m n The utility of PU m when cooperating with SU n; ∆ m n The utility of SU n when cooperating with PU m;
PU and SU Modeling
We now define the PU's and SU's utilities achieved in the cooperative spectrum sharing. Suppose SU n cooperates with PU m in the following way: SU n relays the PU m's signal with a power p m n , and PU m rewards a dedicated access time t m n on its spectrum to SU n. With the AF protocol, the PU m's transmitter PT m broadcasts the data (with unit power) in Phase I, and SU n normalizes the received signal r n,m by a factor √ p m n /|r n,m | and forwards it to PR m in Phase II. The receiver PR m combines the received signals in Phases I and II with a maximal ratio combining. Essentially, we can view the transmission during Phases I and II as a single-input, two-output complex Gaussian noise channel. Accordingly, the transmission rate during Phases I and II achieved from i.i.d. complex Gaussian inputs is given by the Shannon-Hartley theorem [23] :
where κ 
where G m,n is the channel gain of the channel between PT m and ST n (called the 1st relay channel), and G n,m is the channel gain of the channel between ST n and PR m (called the 2nd relay channel). Obviously, the SNR κ 
We define PU m's utility as the increase of its transmission rate when cooperating with an SU n, i.e.,
where
is PU m's direct transmission rate without any relay.
Similarly, the SU n's transmission rate in Phase III on the PU m's frequency band is given by [23] :
where G n(m) is the SU n's direct channel (ST n to SR n ) gain on the PU m's frequency band. Note that each SU n may have different direct channel gains G n(m) on different PU m's band, due to the frequency selective fading. Moreover, there is no interference between SUs' transmissions as they operate on non-overlapping bands.
Since the SU n's transmission occupies
Tm+t m n fraction of each frame, its equivalent transmission rate during the entire frame (when cooperating with PU m) is
The SU n's total energy consumption during the entire frame (when cooperating with PU m) is
where the first term is due to relaying PU m's traffic, and the second term is due to SU n's own traffic (with a normalized unit transmission power). We define the SU n's utility (when cooperating with PU m) as the difference between the achieved transmission rate and the incurred power cost, denoted by
is the average transmission power, and C n is its sensitivity for unit power consumption.
TWO-SIDED MARKET FORMULATION
Before the detailed modeling of the spectrum sharing market, we first provide the definition of a basic twosided matching market (also called two-sided market).
Definition 1 (Two-sided Matching Market): A two-sided matching market is a market consisting of two disjoint sets of users, where an user on one side can be matched with only one user on the other side.
A one-to-one (binary) matching (or just matching) in a two-sided market is defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Matching): A one-to-one matching between two disjoint sets M and N can be represented by a one-to-one correspondence µ(·), where m ∈ M is mapped to n ∈ N (i.e., µ(m) = n) if and only if n is also mapped to m (i.e., µ(n) = m).
For notational convenience, we will also write µ(m) as µ m and µ(n) as µ n when there is no confusion caused.
Two-sided Market Modeling
In our model, each PU has different preferences over SUs depending on the locations of SUs, and wants to select the most efficient SU as relay; each SU also has different preferences over PUs depending on its channel gains on PUs' bands, and want to obtain the dedicated spectrum access time from the most "generous" PU. Thus, we can
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formulate this model as a two-sided market, with PUs on one side and SUs on the other side. A PU is matched to an SU (or equivalently, an SU is matched to a PU) means that the PU cooperates with the SU, that is, the SU relays traffic for the PU, and the PU rewards dedicated spectrum access time to the SU. Clearly, in this twosided market, we need to consider not only the binary matching between PUs and SUs (given in Definition 2), but also the detailed resource exchange between each pair of matched PU and SU. 5 More specifically, for each pair of matched PU and SU, the PU's and SU's utilities depend not only on the SU's relay power (in Phase II), but also on the PU's spectrum access time reward (in Phase III). In addition, an increase in one user's utility will lead to a (not necessarily the same amount of) decrease in the other's utility in the matching pair. Therefore, we face a two-sided market with transferrable utility, where each user's utility (or preference) in a given matching pair is not fixed, but depends on the resource exchange with the matched user (i.e., the access time reward and relay power).
Based on the above discussion, we address the following matching problem for the proposed market:
Question 1 (Relay-Assignment): What kind of matching pairs will emerge from users' strategic interactions?
Question 2 (Resource-Exchange): What is the detailed resource exchange (i.e., the access time and relay power) for each pair of matched PU and SU?
Market Equilibrium -Stable Matching
Now we consider the above matching problem from a game-theoretical analysis. Note that game theory is applicable to our model, as PUs and SUs are rational and self-interested, and always want to maximize their own utilities. Furthermore, one user's decision will affect others' utilities and decisions. To solve the matching problem, it would be useful to understand what kind of matching will be "broken" (and thus unstable).
Definition 3 (Unstable Matching): A matching will be broken if one of the following conditions is satisfied:
(a) There exist a PU and an SU who are not matched to each other but both prefer to be; (b) There exists a PU or an SU with a negative utility in the existing matching.
5. Since each binary matching is associated with a set of resource exchanges (each for a pair of matched users), we will use the terminology "matching" to denote both (i) the binary matching between PUs and SUs, and (ii) the resource exchange for each pair of matched users.
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Incomplete Incormation Complete Information In (a), the PU and the SU would discard their current partners and match to each other. In (b), the PU or SU would remain single rather than stick to the current partner. Thus, a broken matching is "unstable".
As long as a matching is not broken, we call it a stable matching, or equivalently, a market equilibrium.
Definition 4 (Market Equilibrium): A market equilibrium is a stable matching, where no user can improve its utility via unilateral deviation (i.e., choosing another partner or changing resource exchange details).
Based on the above definitions, we can rewrite the matching problem (given in Questions 1 and 2) into the following equivalent question: what market equilibrium (stable matching) will emerge in the two-sided matching market? Notice that there are many important factors affecting the market equilibrium realization, one of which is: which side of the market has the market power to propose cooperation offers to the other side [15] . In this paper, we consider a PU-proposal market, where PUs have the authority to propose offers. 6 That is, each PU decides which SU to select and what time reward and relay power request to/from that SU, and each SU passively accepts or rejects the received offer. The study of a PU-proposal market is motivated by the fact that PUs usually have more market power than SUs in cooperative spectrum sharing, since their number is limited and they own the scarce spectrum licenses.
Network Information
In addition to who are the proposers, the information scenario also affects the equilibrium. That is, which equilibrium will eventually appear also depends on how much network information are known to PUs. In our 6 . Note that the analysis for the PU-proposal market can be directly extended to the SU-proposal market, where SUs propose offers to PUs, and PUs simply accept or reject the received offers. model, the key network information mainly include 7 (a) G m : the direct channel gain of each PU m; (b) G n(m) : the direct channel gain of each SU n on each PU m's spectrum band; (c) G m,n and G n,m : the relay channel gains between each pair of PU m and SU n. For convenience, we illustrate the network information (between PU m and SU n) in Figure 3 , where the label in each link denotes the associated channel gain.
In this work, we consider two different information scenarios: complete information and incomplete information, depending on how much network information the PUs know. Specifically, in the complete information scenario, each PU m is assumed to know the whole network information, i.e., {G m , G n(m) , G m,n , G n,m } n∈N ,m∈M . In the incomplete information scenario, each PU m is assumed to know its local network information only, i.e., {G m , G n(m) , G m,n , G n,m } n∈N , but not those of other PUs. Note that the incomplete information scenario is more practical, as a PU can use reference signal strength (RSS) to detect the channel gains to all potential SUs, yet it is hard for him to estimate other PUs' channel gains. For convenience, we summarize these information scenarios in Figure 4 . 8 In what follows, we will characterize the sufficient and necessary conditions for the market equilibrium (of the PU-proposal market) in Section 6, and study which equilibria will emerge in complete and incomplete information scenarios in Section 7. For convenience, we summarize these information scenarios and the associated market equilibria in Table 2 .
A SIMPLIFIED MODEL
Before studying the market equilibrium in the general model, we first consider a simplified model where the access time reward offered by each PU (in Phase III) and the relay power contributed by each SU (in Phase II) are fixed. Thus, we only need to consider the binary matching between PUs and SUs (i.e., the relay assignment problem defined in Question 1). 9 Note that we use this simple model to illustrate some key properties of the proposed matching market, which 7 . Notice that we view the cooperative transmission time Tm of each PU m and the power sensitivity Cn of each SU n as public information. This is because these parameters are usually pre-defined and keep unchanged in a long time, given the types of PUs or SUs.
8. We further study a strongly incomplete information scenario in the online technical report [29] , where each PU m does not even know each SU n's channel gain, i.e., G n(m) . The equilibrium analysis for such a stronger incomplete information scenario is similar.
9. This model is similar to the two-sided market model in [15] , [20] , and our results in this section also refer to those in [15] , [20] .
is essential for understanding the general model in Sections 6 and 7. Moreover, this simplified model is useful for the network scenario with inflexible relay protocols or static physical layer specifications, where secondary access time and relay power cannot be freely adjusted.
Users' Preferences
With fixed time reward and relay power, each user's utility for each particular partner on the other side is fixed. Thus, the model degenerates to a two-sided matching problem without utility transferring (similar to the Marriage model considered in [15] ).
Let t m denote the (fixed) spectrum access time rewarded by PU m for any SU collaborating with him, and p n the (fixed) relaying power offered by SU n for any PU collaborating with him. The preferences of a PU m can be represented by an ordered list in the decreasing preference, P (m), on the SUs,
is the PU m's utility defined in (4). The first condition means that PU m prefers an SU who provides him a higher utility, and the second condition means that PU m never selects an SU who brings him a negative utility.
Similarly, the preference list of an SU n on the PUs can be represented by
is the SU n's utility in (8).
An Example and Its Equilibrium
We provide an example to illustrate the equilibria under the fixed preferences. 11 Recall that a binary matching between PUs and SUs is represented by a correspondence µ(·), where µ m = n (or equivalently, µ n = m) means PU m is matched to SU n, and µ m = ∅ or µ n = ∅ means PU m or SU n remains single (i.e., not engaged in the cooperative spectrum sharing).
Example 1: Consider a two-sided market with 3 PUs (m 1 , m 2 , m 3 ) and 3 SUs (n 1 , n 2 , n 3 ) with preferences: 10 . The number of elements in set P (m) could be smaller than N , that is, PU m is only interested in a subset of SUs.
11. The complete equilibrium analysis for such a simplified model (with the fixed preferences) can be referred to [29] .
PUs' preferences SUs' preferences
According to the definition of equilibrium in Definition 4, we can easily obtain the following three equilibria µ a , µ b , and µ c for the above example:
Let us check the feasibility of the above equilibria using the definition of market equilibrium. Take the equilibrium µ b as an example, where PU m 1 is matched to SU n 2 , PU m 2 is matched to SU n 3 , and PU m 3 is matched to SU n 1 . We can easily find that PU m 1 prefers SU n 1 than its current partner SU n 2 (as Π m1 n2 < Π m1 n1 ), but SU n 1 has no incentive to discard its current partner PU m 3 and pair with PU m 1 (as ∆ m3 n1 > ∆ m1 n1 ). Similarly, PU m 2 prefers SU n 2 than its current partner SU n 3 , but SU n 2 has no incentive to discard its current partner PU m 1 and pair with PU m 2 . PU m 3 prefers SU n 3 than its current partner SU n 1 , but SU n 1 has no incentive to discard its current partner PU m 2 and pair with PU m 3 . Thus, there does not exist a pair of PU and SU who are not matched to each other but both prefer to be.
MARKET EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
Now we characterize the market equilibrium in a general model where the access time reward and the relay power are not fixed. In this case, each user's utility (with a particular partner at the other side) is no longer fixed, but changes with the resource exchange (i.e., the access time reward and relay power) between them. Accordingly, the preference list of each user depends on its current resource exchanges with users at the other side. Thus, we need to consider not only the binary matching between PUs and SUs (i.e., the relay assignment problem defined in Question 1), but also the resource exchange between each pair of matched users (i.e., the resource exchange problem defined Question 2) .
In what follows, we will start by defining the utility transfer function, which captures the interaction within each matching pair. Then we characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions for market equilibrium. We will show that there are multiple (infinite number) of market equilibria. In the next section, we will further study which specific equilibrium will actually emerge in different information scenarios.
Utility Transfer Function -UTF
Suppose that PU m is matched to SU n. We first study how their utilities change with the access time reward and the relay power.
Recall in the PU-proposal market, PUs propose the offers and SUs decide whether to accept or not. Let δ m n denote the SU n's highest utility from all other PUs' The PU matched to SU n; µm
The SU matched to PU m; δn
The SU n's achieved utility in a given matching; δn
The SU n's highest achievable utility in a matching; δ n The SU n's lowest acceptable utility in a matching;
offers (except PU m's) and from remaining single (not matched to any PU), called reservation utility of SU n (towards PU m). 12 Then, to attract SU n's cooperation, PU m has to offer SU n a utility no less than δ m n . Thus, the PU m's maximum utility is given by
is SU n's utility defined in (8) . Notice that the constraint must be tight at the optimality. This implies that the variable t (11) can be transformed into a single-variable optimization problem. Hence, problem (11) can be solved efficiently using many one-dimension exhaustive search methods. We denote the computational complexity of solving (11) as ρ.
It is easy to check that the PU m's maximal utility Π 
13
To facilitate the understanding of the later analysis, we list some important notations in Table 3 .
Sufficient & Necessary Conditions
Now we study the sufficient and necessary conditions for an equilibrium. The optimization problem (11) shows that the PU m's maximal utility depends on SU n's utility δ m n , so does the optimal access time t m n and relay power p m n . Thus, the resource exchange problem in Question 2 is equivalent to the following utility division problem: 12 . Note that an SU n's reservation utility is PU-dependent, i.e., δ m 1 n may be different from δ m 2 n , as it is the SU's highest utility from all but one of the PUs.
13. An illustration of UTF is provided by Figure 6 in [29] .
what is the utility for each SU in a matching? This means that we can rewrite a matching as
where µ n denotes the PU matched to SU n, and δ n denotes the SU n's utility in the given matching. 14 Obviously, in such a matching, the utility of PU µ n (i.e., the PU matched to SU n) is f µn n (δ n ), which is PU µ n 's maximum achievable utility computed by (11) . Note that the utility is zero for an unmatched SU n (with µ n = ∅) or PU m (with m = µ n , ∀n ∈ N ).
In what follows, we will present the lower-bound and upper-bound of each δ n (for the matched PU µ n and SU n), such that none of PUs and SUs has an incentive to break the current matching. To achieve this, for each pair of matched PU µ n and SU n: (i) PU µ n (or SU n) has no incentive to break the current matching by remaining single, or by pairing with another SU (or PU), and (ii) all PUs other than µ n (or all SUs other than n) have no incentives to discard their respective partners and pair with SU n (or PU µ n ).
According to Definition 4, we first have the following necessary conditions for an equilibrium.
Lemma 1: If {(µ n , δ n ), ∀n} is an equilibrium, then the following conditions hold: for each SU n ∈ N ,
where µ n denotes the PU matched to SU n.
The first condition is generally referred to as Individual Rationality (IR), and the second condition is generally referred to as Incentive Compatibility (IC). The proof follows directly from the definition of equilibrium: If the IR condition is violated by a PU µ n , then PU µ n will discard its partner (SU n) and remain single; If the IC condition is violated by a PU µ n , i.e., there exists another SU k = n such that f µn n (δ n ) < f µn k (δ k ), then PU µ n can get a better utility by paring up with SU k instead. 15 The IC and IR conditions for a PU µ n ensure that PU µ n has no incentive to change its decision. We further introduce the Competitive Compatibility (CC) condition for PU µ n , which ensures that no other PUs has the incentive to compete with a PU µ n (for SU n). Intuitively, the CC condition for a PU µ n (i.e., the PU matched to SU n) means no other PU m can achieve a higher utility on SU n than on its current partner SU µ m . Formally, Lemma 2: If {(µ n , δ n ), ∀n} is an equilibrium, then the following condition holds: for each PU µ n ∈ M,
where µ m denotes the SU matched to PU m.
The IR condition for a PU µ n implies
14. Note we omit the superscript µn in δ µn n for simplicity of writing. 15. With a proper offer from PU µn (e.g., giving SU k a utility δ k + , where is any infinitesimal positive number), SU k will also improve its utility through the new pairing and thus will accept.
16. Note that f m µm (·) ≡ 0 if µm = ∅, which denotes the utility of PU m when not engaging in any collaboration.
where g µn n (0) = f µn n (−1) (0) is the maximum achievable utility of SU n when leaving zero utility to PU µ n . The IC condition for a PU µ n implies
Based on the above discussions, we can obtain the lowest acceptable utility δ n and the highest achievable utility δ n for an SU n in an equilibrium {(µ(n), δ n ), ∀n}, i.e.,
Intuitively, PU µ n cannot offer a utility δ n lower than δ n to SU n, otherwise some other PU m = µ n will have the incentive to pair up with SU n (by offering SU n a utility slightly higher than δ n ). This will make the original matching broken. On the other hand, PU µ n will never offer a utility δ n higher than δ n to SU n, otherwise PU µ n would be better off by pairing up with an other SU. This will also make the matching broken. Therefore, we can rewrite the necessary conditions in Lemma 1 more explicitly as follows: If a matching {(µ n , δ n ), ∀n} is an equilibrium, the condition holds:
where δ n and δ n are defined in (13) and (14), respectively. The left inequality is due to the CC condition, and the right inequality is due to the IC and IR conditions. The next theorem shows the above conditions are not only necessary, but also sufficient.
Theorem 1 (Sufficient & Necessary Condition): A matching {(µ n , δ n ), ∀n} is an equilibrium, if and only if δ n ≤ δ n ≤ δ n , ∀n ∈ N .
Due to space limit, we put the detailed proof in [29] .
Property of Equilibrium
To facilitate the characterization of equilibrium in different information scenarios (in the next section), we first show the following property for equilibrium.
Lemma 3 (Generalized Lattice Theorem): Given any possible binary matching µ(·), if {(µ n , δ I n ), ∀n} and {(µ n , δ II n ), ∀n} are equilibria, then the matching {(µ n , δ X n ), ∀n} with δ X n = min(δ I n , δ II n ) is also an equilibrium. Lemma 3 can be seen as a generalization of the Lattice Theorem proposed by Kunth [24] for the basic two-sided matching (without utility transferring). By repeatedly applying Lemma 3 on any two equilibria, we will reach the unique optimal equilibrium for PUs.
Theorem 2 (Optimality): There exists a Pareto-optimal equilibrium {(µ n , δ * n ), ∀n} for PUs, where every PU achieves its maximum utility among all equilibria. In addition, {(µ n , δ * n ), ∀n} satisfies:
Theorem 2 not only shows the existence of the Paretooptimal equilibrium for PUs, but also suggests a method to calculate the Pareto-optimal equilibrium for PUs. Specifically, given any feasible matching µ(·), we can derive each SU's utility (and the associated time reward and relay power) under the Pareto-optimal equilibrium by jointly solving the following function set:
Obviously, if there is a unique solution for (15), it must be the unique Pareto-optimal equilibrium. If there is no solution for (15), the matching µ(·) is not feasible. However, directly solving the above function set is difficult. Consider a single equation in the function set (say, δ n ). To solve this equation, we first need to compute the utilities of all PUs other than µ n on their own matching pairs, i.e., f m µm (δ µm ), ∀m = µ n . Then, we need to compute the SU n's maximum achievable utility when giving each PU m = µ n a utility f m µm (δ µm ), i.e., g m n f m µm (δ µm ) , ∀m = µ n . Finally, the SU n's utility δ n is the maximum of the above computed maximum achievable utilities and zero. Obviously, for this single equation, we need to repeatedly solve the optimization problem (11) 2·(M −1) times. Furthermore, jointly solving N equations makes the problem even more complicated. This motivates us to study low complexity algorithms to realize different market equilibria in the next section.
MARKET EQUILIBRIUM REALIZATION
In the previous section, we characterized the necessary and sufficient conditions of market equilibrium. In this section, we will study which equilibrium will actually emerge in different information scenarios.
Specifically, we consider two typical information scenarios: complete and incomplete information, depending on how much network information the PUs know (see Section 4.3 for details). Notice that in the PU-proposal market, PUs propose offers and SUs respond by rejecting or accepting offers. Under complete information, each PU knows the whole network information, and can precisely predict the SUs' preferences. Thus, SUs cannot mis-represent their preferences, and have to respond in the truthful manner. That is, each SU will always accept the best offer that brings him the maximum positive utility. Under incomplete information, however, each PU 17 . Similarly, there always exists a Pareto-optimal equilibrium {(µn, δ * n ), ∀n} for SUs, where every SU achieves its maximum utility among all equilibria. In addition, {(µn, δ * n ), ∀n} satisfies: δ * n = δ * n , ∀n.
knows only its local network information, and cannot predict the SUs' preferences with other PUs. Thus, SUs can potentially mis-represent their preferences, and respond in a non-truthful manner. That is, each SU may reject the best offer that brings him the maximum positive utility, as long as such a mis-representation can bring him a better utility.
Equilibrium under Complete Information
Under complete information, each SU has to respond in a truthful manner, and accept the best offer that brings him the maximum positive utility. In this sense, we can view the SUs' (truthful) responses as natural reactions. Therefore, the matching problem can be viewed as an M -player game with complete information, where game players are PUs, whose objectives are to maximize their own utilities. By (11) , each PU's maximal utility strictly decreases with the utility of the matched SU. Thus, given all other PUs' offers (strategies), the best strategy for a particular PU µ n (i.e., the PU matched to SU n) is to offer the lowest acceptable utility to its matched SU n, i.e., δ n = δ n . This essentially lead to the Pareto-optimal equilibrium for PUs (PU-Optimal-EQ).
Next we show how to compute the PU-Optimal-EQ in the complete information scenario. Notice that when µ(·) is given, the PU-Optimal-EQ can be computed by jointly solving (15) , which is complicated as mentioned previously. Moreover, an exhaustive search of all feasible µ(·) requires going through a total of M ! possibilities, which has an exponential-time complexity. This makes the solving process mathematically intractable.
To this end, we introduce a "Generalized Deferred Acceptance" (G-DAC) algorithm in Algorithm 1, which converges to the PU-Optimal-EQ in polynomial-time complexity. Specifically, in the G-DAC algorithm, each PU m maintains a vector ∆ m = (δ m 1 , ..., δ m N ), which records the utilities it is willing to offer to each SU. The basic idea of the G-DAC algorithm is: (i) in each round, each PU m proposes to the best SU based on ∆ m , and each SU n accepts the best proposal and rejects others; and (ii) if PU m is rejected by SU n in a round, it increases the offer δ n by a small positive value in the following rounds. The G-DAC algorithm generalizes the DAP algorithm [15] in the following aspect. In the DAP algorithm, when a PU is rejected by an SU, it will propose to another SU in later rounds (as the SU who has rejected its offer will never accept its offer in the future); while in the G-DAC algorithm, the PU will continue to increase the utility to the SU (attempting to attract the SU), until the offer is accepted by the SU or the PU can achieve a higher utility by proposing an offer to another SU. 18 Hence, it brings an additional degree of freedom for PUs making their decisions. Namely, each PU decides not only the target SU that it is going to propose to, but also the utility that it is going to transfer to the SU.
Lemma 4: The G-DAC algorithm converges to the Pareto-optimal equilibrium for PUs (PU-Optimal-EQ), if the stepsize is small engouth.
To prove the above lemma, we can first show that the convergence state of G-DAC satisfies the conditions in Theorem 1, and is therefore an equilibrium. Then we can prove the optimality by showing that the G-DAC will stop at the first equilibrium it achieves, which is exactly the Pareto-optimal equilibrium for PUs.
Next we discuss the communication overhead and computational complexity of the G-DAC algorithm. In each round, each PU m needs to send one request message to a particular SU, and each SU n needs to send back one acceptance message to a particular PU. Thus, the communication overhead is linear in the number of PU-SU pairs (and hence is low). In terms of computation, each PU m needs to solve the optimization problem (11) at most once with complexity ρ in each round (except the first round where the PU needs to solve the optimization problem (11) N times with complexity N ρ), since at most one price in the vector
is changed in each round. Furthermore, each PU needs to find the maximal utility among N utilities, and each SU needs to find the best offer among at most M proposals. Thus, the total computational complexity is O(T · (M ρ + M N + N M )), where T = n∈N δ * n is the maximum possible iterations, and ρ is the complexity of solving problem (11).
Equilibrium under Incomplete Information
Under incomplete information, each SU can respond in a non-truthful manner, and may reject the best offer that brings him the maximum positive utility, as long as such a mis-representation can bring a better utility for the SU. This can be seen from the following example.
Example 2: Suppose PU µ n proposes the lowest acceptable utility to its matched SU n (as in the complete information scenario). The SU n can simply reject this offer (which is its best offer for SU n according to the definition of the lowest acceptable utility), such that PU µ n increases the utility offered to SU n.
By the above example, we can see that different misrepresentation behaviors of SUs (e.g., determining when to accept a PU's offer, and when to reject) may lead to different market equilibria. Unfortunately, due to the continuity of utility, there are infinite number of misrepresentation behaviors of SUs. Thus, it is impossible to characterize all possible mis-representation behaviors of SUs. To this end, we will focus on characterizing a robust equilibrium for PUs (PU-Robust-EQ), which provides every PU a guaranteed utility under any possible misrepresentations of SUs.
Similarly, the robust equilibrium for PUs (PU-Robust-EQ) can be achieved by a "Generalized Reversed Deferred Acceptance" (G-RDAC) algorithm in Algorithm 2, which is same as the G-DAC Algorithm 1 except that it reverses the roles of PUs and SUs in proposing offers. 19 Since the G-DAC algorithm and G-RDAC algorithm are symmetric, we can easily show that the G-RDAC algorithm converges to the Pareto-optimal equilibrium for SUs, which is also the worst-case equilibrium for PUs. Therefore, every PU is guaranteed to achieve a utility no worse than that in this worst-case equilibrium, under any possible misrepresentations of SUs. In this sense, we refer to this worst-case equilibrium for PUs as the robust equilibrium for PUs. Each PU m accepts the SU offering him highest utility; 6: Each SU n updates π 
Equilibrium under Arbitrary Information
It is important to note that the PU-Robust-EQ guarantees every PU's lowest achievable utility among all equilibria, while the PU-Optimal-EQ ensures every PU's highest achievable utility among all equilibria. This implies that under any possible equilibrium (in any information scenario), every PU's utility must be bounded by its utilities under the PU-Robust-EQ and the PU-Optimal-EQ. Our numerical studies in the next section further show that in a typical market where the number of PUs and SUs are different, the gap between the PU-Robust-EQ and the PU-Optimal-EQ is quite small. Hence, the PU-Robust-EQ or PU-Optimal-EQ can be viewed as an effective approximation to understand all equilibria.
SIMULATION RESULTS
To highlight the performance gain achieved from cooperative spectrum sharing, we focus on such a network scenario in simulations, where PUs' direct channel gains are much smaller than SUs' relay channel gains. This may happen when PUs' direct links are highly attenuated due to shadow fading or obstacles. This is very intuitive: only when an SU can provide a large enough benefit to a 19 . Similarly, we can show that the G-RDAC algorithm is equivalent to an English-auction with PUs as auctioneers and SUs as bidders. The PUs' utility gap between PU-Optimal-EQ and PU-Robust-EQ is less than 10% when M = N . PU, the PU has the incentive to cooperating with the SU, which is a prerequisite of the cooperative spectrum sharing studied in this paper.
We distribute PUs' and SUs' transceiver pairs in a square area of size 1500 × 1500m 2 , and set the distance of each PU's transceiver pair close to 1000m and the distance of each SU's transceiver pair close to 400m (which are the typical transmission ranges between mobile phones and cellular base stations). Unless otherwise stated, the following default network setting will be used: (i) C n = T m = 1, (ii) σ 2 = −105dBm, and (iii) the channel gains are chosen based on the free-space path loss model in [26] .
We evaluate the PUs' performance under different market equilibria (illustrations of equilibria can be found in [29] ). Note that the SUs' performance can be estimated directly from the conflicting interests between PUs and SUs, that is, an equilibrium that is better for all PUs must be worse for all SUs. In the following, each result is the average of 1000 simulations with randomly generated network topologies. Figure 5 illusrates the PUs' total utilities vs the number of SUs N under different market equilibria, where the number of PUs is M = 2 in the left figure, and M = 4 in the right figure. The red curve denotes the total PUs' utility under the PU-Optimal-EQ, and the blue dash curve denotes the total PUs' utility under the PU-Robust-EQ. Obviously, the total PUs' utility under any other equilibrium is bounded by these two curves.
From Figure 5 , we can see that the PUs' total utility under equilibrium increases with the number of SUs N (as the competition among SUs increases with N ), and decreases with the number of PUs M (as the competition among PUs increases with M ). Moreover, when M < N , PUs can extract most of the generated utility (as the competition among SUs is more intense), and when M > N , SUs can extract most of the generated utility (as the competition among PUs is more intense). We further have the following observations.
(1) In the general case where the numbers of PUs and SUs are different (i.e., M = N ), the utility gap between PU-Optimal-EQ and PU-Robust-EQ is quite small (e.g., less than 10% in both figures). This implies that the information scenario (i.e., the amount of network information that PUs know) has a small impact on the market equilibrium.
(2) In the special case where the numbers of PUs and SUs are identical (i.e., M = N ), the utility gap between PU-Optimal-EQ and PU-Robust-EQ is large. This implies that the information scenario has a significant impact on the market equilibrium.
Intuitively, when N = M , the imbalance of competition among PUs and among SUs reduces the effect of information incompleteness. The reason is as follows. If the number of SUs is larger than that of PUs (N > M ), the intensified competition among SUs pushes SUs to reveal their preferences close to the true values. If the number of PUs is larger than that of SUs (M > N ), the intensified competition among PUs already drives most of the generated welfare to the SU-side even in the worstcase equilibrium for SUs, and thus the SUs' performance gain in other equilibria is small. When M = N , however, none of the two sides has a dominated competition level in the market, thus the effect of information incompleteness becomes significant.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the cooperative spectrum sharing between multiple PUs and multiple SUs using the matching theory. We formulate the problem as a twosided matching market, and characterize the market equilibrium systematically. We further study which equilibrium will actually emerge in both complete and incomplete information scenarios. Our study can facilitate the design of large networks, in which players can be split into two different types, interacting with each other. The interaction between players is not restricted within the cooperative spectrum sharing studied in this work, but can be quite general (e.g., spectrum trading). There are some possible directions to extend the results in this paper. An interesting direction is to consider a more general cooperative spectrum sharing protocol where each PU can cooperate with multiple SUs to relay its traffic, and each SU can cooperates with multiple PUs to access their spectrum. In this case, the resulting matching is no longer a one-to-one correspondence between PUs and SUs, but a multiple-to-multiple correspondence between PUs and SUs. 
A. Strongly Incomplete Information
In the main manuscript, we have studied the complete information and incomplete information scenarios. Now we consider the strongly incomplete information scenario, where each PU only knows its own channel and relay channel information, but not SUs' channel information. In this case, each PU does not have enough information to solve the optimization problem (11), even if it knows the reservation utility of its matched SU. Thus, we need to consider not only the mis-representations of SUs, but also the proposing rule with which PUs can calculate the desired offers to SUs.
To this end, we will first design a proposing rule for PUs based on their "guesses" about SUs' information. Then we will study the incentive for SUs to truthfully represent their preferences under the new proposing rule, and characterize the corresponding equilibrium.
The basic idea of the guess-based proposing rule is as follows. First, each PU m guesses the necessary information (called type) about every SU, and proposes an offer aiming at extracting the entire cooperation gain from an SU with the guessed information. 20 If it is rejected by an SU, the PU updates its guess about this SU, and propose a new offer (aiming at extracting the entire cooperation gain from the SU with the updated guess).
To capture the key information that PU m wants to know about SUs, we introduce the concept of type for each SU m, denoted by H 
where A CnTm 2·(Tm+t m n ) is a constant. By (16), we can easily find that to ask for a relay power p m n from SU n, PU m has to reward an access time no smaller than t m n · H m n to SU n (otherwise SU n will get a negative utility, and thus will never accept the offer). Obviously, PU m is able to derive the optimal proposing rule to SU n from (11) only if it knows the real type 20 . Note that we can neither prove the optimality of this proposing rule, nor find another rule always better than this one. Nevertheless, through simulations we can see that the PUs' performances with this proposing rule are very closed to those with optimal proposing rule (11) under weakly incomplete information. 
The constraint in (17) shows that (i) if H m n = H m n (i.e., the guessed SU type is exactly same as the true SU type), then SU n will achieve a zero utility from the PU m's proposed offer given by (17) , and (ii) if H 
where t Notice that all results based on UTF in Section 6.A-D can be directly applied to the model based on GS-UTF here. Specifically, the necessary and sufficient conditions for an equilibrium can be characterized by Theorem 1 (by simply replacing all involved UTF functions into the GS-UTF functions). The optimality of equilibrium can be proved by a similar Lattice theorem in Lemma 3. Note that here the "optimality" refers to the optimal equilibrium restricted within the above guess-based proposing rule, but not the globally optimal equilibrium in all possible proposing rules. As mentioned previously, it is challenging to characterize the globally optimal equilibrium.
Similarly, we can obtain a lower-bound equilibrium (in terms of PUs' utilities) by a "Guess-based Generalized Reversed Deferred Acceptance" procedure (GSG-RDAC), which is the same as the G-RDAC except the utility transferring function. The details of the GSG-RDAS is skipped due to the space limit. We referred to the equilibrium resulting from the GSG-RDAC as PU-Pessimistic-EQ-GS. Obviously, PU-Pessimistic-EQ-GS guarantees the worst-case utility of every PU, with the above guess-based proposing rule, under all possible mis-representations of SUs.
B. Illustrations of Equilibria in Simulations
Now we illustrate the equilibria (i.e., utility division and relay assignment) in simulations.
(1) Utility Division under Equilibrium We first illustrate the utility division (or equivalently, resource exchange) under market equilibria to provide an illustrative impression on the market equilibrium. Figure 6 illustrates the utility transfer functions (UTF) and the associated equilibrium utility division in the network with (i) one PU {m} and two SUs {n 1 , n 2 } (left figure) and (ii) two PUs {m 1 , m 2 } and one SU {n} (right figure) . Recall that the UTF function represents how a PU's maximal utility changes with the utility of the matched SU. In the left figure, we choose the symmetric topology for the PU and two SUs (with
n,m = −90dBm, n ∈ {n 1 , n 2 }) and different energy costs for two SUs (with C n1 = 1 and C n2 = 2). In this case, PU m is matched to SU n 1 under the market equilibrium. In the right figure, we choose different topologies for the SU and two PUs (with
In this case, SU n is matched to PU m 1 under the market equilibrium. In both figures, the equilibrium utility division among the matched PU and SU is illustrated by the black bold line (between the circle and the square). More specifically, the circle denotes the utility division under the Pareto-optimal equilibrium for PUs (PU-Optimal-EQ), and the square denotes the utility division under the Robust equilibrium for PUs (PU-Robust-EQ). More detailed explanations for these equilibria are given below.
(1) PU-Optimal-EQ in the left of Figure 6 : The PUOptimal-EQ can be achieved by offering the lowest acceptable utility (i.e., zero in this example) to SU n 1 . Obviously, the PU achieves its maximum utility under PU-Optimal-EQ among all equilibria.
(2) PU-Robust-EQ in the left of Figure 6 : The PURobust-EQ can be achieved by offering the highest achievable utility (i.e., 0.5 in this example) to SU n 1 . Note that due to the competition among SUs, SU n 1 cannot requesting a utility higher than 0.5 from the PU (which will leave the PU a utility lower than 0.8), otherwise, SU n 2 can successfully pair with the PU by requesting a utility slightly higher than zero (which will leave the PU a utility of 0.8). This implies that the PU is guaranteed to obtain a utility of 0.8 (i.e., that under PU-Robust-EQ).
(3) PU-Optimal-EQ in the right of Figure 6 : The PUOptimal-EQ can be achieved when PU m 1 offers the lowest acceptable utility (i.e., 1.7 in this example) to SU n. Note that due to the competition among PUs, PU m 1 cannot offer a utility lower than 1.7 to SU n, otherwise, PU m 2 can offer a utility of 1.7 to SU n such that SU n accepts the offer of PU m 2 . Similarly, PU m 1 achieves its maximum utility under the PU-Optimal-EQ among all equilibria. 21 (4) PU-Robust-EQ in the right of Figure 6 : The PURobust-EQ can be achieved when PU m 1 offers the highest achievable utility (i.e., 2.2 in this example) to SU n. Note that PU m 1 will never offer a utility higher than 2.2 to SU n, otherwise, it will achieve a negative utility. Therefore, the PU-Robust-EQ provides PU m 1 a guaranteed utility of zero.
From Figure 6 , we can also see that the PUs' and SUs' equilibrium utilities are greatly affected by the numbers of PUs and SUs. Specifically, when the number of PUs is smaller than that of SUs (left figure), the PU is likely to achieve a large utility under the market equilibrium, benefiting from the competition of SUs. When the number of PUs is larger than that of SUs (right figure), the PUs are likely to achieve small utilities under the market equilibrium, suffering from the competition of PUs. Later in Figure 5 we will show this observation more explicitly.
(2) Relay Assignment under Equilibrium
Now we illustrate the relay assignment under the market equilibrium. To provide a clear impression, we simulate a network with 4 PUs and 4 SUs shown in Figure  7 , where primary receivers (PRs) are co-located at the middle of the area (denoted by the trangle), and primary transmitters (PTs) are located close to the edges of the area (denoted by squares). We use the default network setting except the channel gains, which are derived by the free-space path loss model in [26] . Figure 7 illustrates the network topology and the associated relay assignment (i.e., PU-SU matching) under the market equilibrium. In this example, SU i is assigned to relay for PU i, ∀i 
2 PUs {m1, m2} and 1 SU {n} Fig. 6 . Utility Division under Market Equilibrium. Left: one PU {m} and two SUs {n 1 , n 2 }. PU m is matched to SU n 1 under the market equilibrium. Right: two PUs {m 1 , m 2 } and one SU {n}. SU n is matched to PU m 1 under the market equilibrium. The equilibrium utility division among the matched PU and SU is illustrated by the black bold line.
i's) utilities under the PU-Optimal-EQ (blue) and the PU-Robust-EQ (red), respectively. Specifically, under the PU-Optimal-EQ, PUs' utilities are {0.4, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6}, and SUs' utilities are {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0}; Under the PU-Robust-EQ, PUs' utilities are {0.3, 0, 0.2, 0}, and SUs' utilities are {0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.3}. Detailed discussions about such a utility difference are given below.
(1) PU 4 and SU 4: PU 4 and SU 4 are far apart from other users, and their interaction will be slightly affected by others' interactions. Thus, under the PU-Optimal-EQ, SU 4 will achieve the lowest acceptable utility (i.e., 0). Under the PU-Robust-EQ, SU 4 will achieve the highest acceptable utility (i.e., 0.3), and PU 4 can only achieve a zero utility.
(2) PUs 1 and 3: PU 1 is close to SUs {1, 2, 3}, and can potentially cooperate with these SUs. Thus, SUs {1, 2, 3} will compete with each for PU 1. Similar to the left figure of Figure 6 , the PU can achieve a high utility (i.e., 0.3) under the (worst-case) robust equilibrium PU-Robust-EQ, benefiting from the competition of SUs. Similarly, PU 3 can potentially cooperate with multiple SUs {1, 3}, and thus will also achieve a high utility (i.e., 0.2) under the PU-Robust-EQ.
C. Implementation Issues
In this subsection, we briefly discuss the implementation issues of the proposed cooperative sharing scheme.
We first discuss how PUs obtain information in different information scenarios. As shown in Section 4.3, we consider two information scenarios: complete and incomplete information. First, complete information is an ideal benchmark (though not practical) case, where PUs know everything about the network. Second, incomplete information is a more practical case, where each PU knows only the local information, including its own channel gain, its relay channel gains (with neighboring SUs), and the neighboring SUs' channel gains. The first class of local information can be easily obtained via measuring the average Received Signal Strength (RSS) from the PU's transmitter to receiver. The second class of local information can be obtained via measuring the average RSS from SUs's transmitters to the PU's transmitter and receiver, respectively. The third class of local information (i.e., SUs' channel gains), however, cannot be measured by the PU directly. Nevertheless, by measuring the average RSS from a SU's transmitter to the PU's transmitter and receiver jointly, the PU can estimate the SU transmitter's location (i.e., obtaining two candidate points); with the similar method, the PU can estimate the SU receiver's location (i.e., obtaining two candidate points). Hence, there are at most four possibilities for an SU's topology. With certain additional knowledge (e.g., historical information or SU report), the PU can derive the exact topology of the SU, and further calculate the SU's average channel gain. 22 We then discuss the time synchronization, which is a very important implementation issue. In the existing literature of cooperative communications, researchers have proposed many techniques to address this issue (see, e.g., [27] ). In our model, we would like to clarify that we do not require all PUs and SUs to be fully synchronized during the whole interaction period. As in many existing literature (e.g., [8] - [14] ), we assume that there exists a common control channel for the necessary communications and interactions between PUs and SUs. Namely, PUs and SUs transmit all of the control signals (e.g., beacon, PU proposal, and SU response) on the common control channel using certain multiple access method such as CDMA, and continuously monitor the common control channel to decode the desired control signals. Hence, PUs and SUs can interact (on the common control channel) in the asynchronous manner during the matching period (i.e., in the processing of Algorithms 2 and 3); when a stable matching is reached (i.e., after the convergence of Algorithms 2 and 3), each pair of matched PU and SU then operate (on the PU's operating channel) in the synchronous manner during 22 . It is important to note that such an estimation is based on assumption that there is no deep fading or shadowing between the SU's transmitter and receiver, hence the channel gain is determined by the transmission distance only. Otherwise, the PU may not be able to estimate the SU's own channel gain correctly. In that case, the estimation will be based on the SU's report directly. their cooperative transmission period (Phases I and II) and secondary transmission period (Phase III). Such a synchronization (among a pair of matched PU and SU in Phases I, II, and III) can be achieved using different methods in the existing cooperative communication literature (e.g., [27] ).
D. Equilibrium Analysis for the Simplified Model
Now we provide the complete equilibrium analysis for the simplified model.
(1) Common & Conflicting Interests on Equilibrium
By Example 1, we can find that there exists a unique Pareto-optimal equilibrium for PUs: µ a , where every PU achieves a no worse utility than in any other equilibrium. Similarly, there exists a unique Pareto-optimal equilibrium for SUs: µ c , where every SU achieves a no worse utility than in any other equilibrium. Lemma 5 shows that this observation is generally applicable.
Lemma 5 (Optimality): There always exists a unique Pareto-optimal equilibrium for PUs, where every PU achieves its maximum utility among all equilibria. Similarly, there always exists a unique Pareto-optimal equilibrium for SUs, where every SU achieves its maximum utility among all equilibria.
The following lemma further shows that among any two equilibria, the equilibrium that is better for all users on one side is always worse for all users on the other side.
Lemma 6 (Conflicting Interest): For any equilibria µ and µ , all PUs prefer µ to µ , if and only if all SUs prefer µ to µ.
Lemmas 5 and 6 show that users on the same side have a common interest and users on the opposite sides have conflicting interests, regarding the set of equilibria.
(2) Equilibrium under Complete Information
Now we study which equilibrium will actually emerge (in the PU-proposal market) under complete information. In this case, any SU's misrepresentation (of its preference list) is not allowed, as PUs know the whole network information and thus know the complete preference lists of SUs.
We first introduce the "deferred acceptance" (DAC) algorithm in [15] , and then show in Lemma 7 the DAC algorithm converges to the Pareto-optimal equilibrium for PUs (PU-Optimal-EQ).
Algorithm 3 DAC
1: while (at least one PU is rejected in previous round) do {
2:
Each PU proposes to the first SU in its preference list; 3: Each SU rejects all proposals but the most preferred; 4: Each PU updates the preference list by removing the SU who just rejected him; } 23. This observation was first discovered by Gale and Shapley in [15] . The detailed proof can also be referred to [15] .
Lemma 7: The DAC algorithm converges the Paretooptimal equilibrium for PUs, i.e., PU-Optimal-EQ.
Notice that every PU can achieve a better utility under the PU-Optimal-EQ than under any other equilibrium. That is, there does not exist another equilibrium, in which at least one PU achieves a higher utility than in the PU-Optimal-EQ. Thus, all PUs are willing to follow the proposing rule in the DAC algorithm in order to achieve the PU-Optimal-EQ. This implies that the PU-Optimal-EQ is the only equilibrium that will emerge under complete information.
(3) Equilibrium under Incomplete Information
Now let us consider the incomplete information scenario, where PUs know their local network information only, and thus cannot know the complete preference lists of SUs. Therefore, it is possible for SUs to misrepresent their preference lists to seek more utilities. We show this by the following example.
Example 3: Consider the same model in Example 1, except that here each PU does not know SUs' preference lists. Suppose SU n 1 misrepresents its preferences by Q(n 1 ) = {m 2 , m 3 }. Then it is easy to check that the DAC algorithm will lead to the equilibrium µ b . Furthermore, if SU n 1 misrepresents its preferences by Q(n 1 ) = {m 2 }, then the DAC algorithm will lead to the Pareto-optimal equilibrium µ c for SUs. In both misrepresentations, SU n 1 achieves a higher utility than truth-telling.
By the above example, we can see that different misrepresentation behaviors of SUs may lead to different market equilibria. Unfortunately, characterizing all misrepresentation behaviors of SUs in the incomplete information scenario is an NP-hard problem. Hence, it is difficult to characterize which specific equilibrium will actually emerge in the incomplete information scenario, due to the uncertainty of SU misrepresentation. To this end, we study the worst-case equilibrium for PUs, and characterize a robust equilibrium for PUs (PU-Robust-EQ), which gives every PU a guaranteed utility under any possible misrepresentations of SUs.
Specifically, the robust equilibrium PU-Robust-EQ can be achieved by a "reversed deferred acceptance" (RDAC) algorithm as in [15] , which is same as the DAC algorithm except that it reverses the roles of PUs and SUs in proposing offers. That is, in the RDAC algorithm, each SU proposes to its most preferred PU among those who have not yet rejected him, and each PU accepts the most preferred proposal and rejects the others. The details of the RDAC algorithm are skipped due to space limit. By the symmetry between two algorithms, the RDAC algorithm converges to the Pareto-optimal equilibrium for SUs, which, by Lemma 6, is the worst-case equilibrium for PUs. Therefore, every PU is guaranteed to achieve a utility no worse than that in this worst-case equilibrium, under any possible misrepresentations of SUs. In this sense, we refer to this worst-case equilibrium for PUs as the robust equilibrium for PUs.
